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How to best manage the failure of systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms was the theme of a recent conference at which 
the latest research on the issue was presented. Here we summarize that research, the discussions that it sparked, and 
the areas where considerable work remains.
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One of the most pressing policy issues facing those who su-
pervise ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms these days is the problem of systemi-
cally important ﬁ  nancial institutions. Sometimes referred to 
as too big to fail, systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions 
are ones whose failure has potential destabilizing spillover 
effects on other ﬁ  nancial companies, ﬁ  nancial markets, and 
the real economy. The resolution process for such ﬁ  rms too 
often includes the passing of their losses on to society at 
large through bailouts of creditors and sometimes share-
holders. This reduces market discipline, and the attendant 
moral hazard leads to more risk taking by systemically 
important ﬁ  nancial companies, which in turn reduces the 
overall stability of the ﬁ  nancial system.
In April 2011, on the heels of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA), the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland held a conference on 
Resolving Insolvent Large and Complex Financial Institu-
tions. The goal of the conference was to bring together legal 
and economic scholars, industry practitioners, and policy-
makers to address the challenges associated with closing 
insolvent systemically important ﬁ  nancial companies and to 
consider some potential policy responses. This Commentary 
summarizes the issues discussed at the conference.
Complexity as a Challenge 
There is an extensive literature on what makes a ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rm systemically important and the difﬁ  culty of resolving 
such ﬁ  rms when they become insolvent. For instance, James 
Thomson argues that in addition to size, there are four gen-
eral sources of systemic importance: contagion, correlation, 
concentration, and conditions (Thomson 2010). A recurring 
theme across the papers and presentations at this conference 
was complexity—of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, markets, and products—
as a source of systemic consequence. Complexity was dis-
cussed in three contexts: transparency (complexity reduces 
it), ﬁ  rm resolution (complexity makes it more difﬁ  cult), 
and regulatory forbearance (complexity encourages regula-
tors to forebear or bail out ﬁ  rms). The 2007-2009 ﬁ  nancial 
crisis exposed a number of breakdowns in the structure of 
corporate governance and in the internal risk controls of 
large and complex ﬁ  rms. Complexity impedes corporate 
governance by reducing transparency of the ﬁ  rm, its opera-
tions, and its connections in the ﬁ  nancial system. It was 
noted that a systemically important ﬁ  nancial institution’s ’ 
operational structure often does not reﬂ  ect its legal structure. 
This reduces the ability of internal stakeholders (boards of 
directors, shareholders, creditors) and external stakeholders 
(regulators and markets) to effectively discipline the ﬁ  rm. 
Naturally, some of this complexity arises because ﬁ  rms must 
contend with overlapping regulatory jurisdictions—both 
within the United States and across sovereign borders.
In addition to causing suboptimal corporate governance, 
complexity is also a major issue when attempting to resolve 
systemically important ﬁ  nancial companies. A large interna-
tionally active ﬁ  nancial company can have a legal structure 
that includes several hundred legal entities, has a presence 
in as many as 100 different national jurisdictions, and may 
face oversight by three or more ﬁ  nancial market supervisors 
in each of the jurisdictions in which it operates. Because 
managing these companies is likely to be conducted along 
functional or business lines without regard to legal entities, 
there are complex relationships across the subsidiaries of the 
conglomerate. This means that intraﬁ  rm connections and 
exposures may be as important a constraint on the orderly 
resolution of the systemically important ﬁ  nancial company 
as are external connections.
Complexity also serves as a constraint on the ability of 
ﬁ  nancial supervisors to close and unwind the operations of 
the ﬁ  rm—at least without fear of systemic spillovers. Because 
of this, complexity can be a source of regulatory forbear-
ance. Research presented at the conference suggests that 
when regulators have overlapping jurisdictions but different 
objectives, they are individually less likely to close a sys-
temically important ﬁ  nancial company than a single regula-
tor with both objectives. Additionally, ﬁ  rms may choose 
to be complex even when the only value of complexity is 
an increased probability of a taxpayer funded bailout. This ate as a single entity under a single bank charter—without 
a parent holding company, afﬁ  liates, or subsidiaries. The 
single charter proposal may be an unreachable goal, in part 
because it would require dramatic changes to the law. How-
ever, it provides a framework for examining the beneﬁ  ts of 
simplifying legal structures, and better aligning them with 
operating structures for the resolution process. 
Under the single-charter proposal, the resolution of a failed 
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm would be placed under the jurisdiction of 
the home country, which would draw on input from the 
members of a supervisor college or other consultative body. 
The objective of the home country supervisor would be to 
maximize the value of the global estate for the beneﬁ  t of all 
stakeholders regardless of location. Host-country supervi-
sors need leverage within this regime to ensure they are 
fully informed and necessary efforts are taken to coordi-
nate the disposition of local afﬁ  liates, assets, or activities. 
This necessary leverage could be provided by giving the 
host-country supervisor the ability to call a meeting of the 
supervisory college or to take independent action if the 
home-country supervisor is unresponsive. A uniﬁ  ed resolu-
tion process, grounded in territoriality but moving toward 
universality, may help counter the destructive nature of 
national ring-fencing of assets and increase overall value.
Discussion of international coordination also emphasized 
the importance of the use of coordinating bodies such as an 
international college of ﬁ  nancial market supervisors. The 
activities of such international bodies could include conduct-
ing annual simulations of a resolution under varying stress 
conditions. These types of simulations could greatly improve 
scenario planning. The exercise would allow supervisors to 
anticipate what might happen and to make appropriate prepa-
rations, such as developing modes of cooperation or making 
clear their intent to ring-fence assets. Although these exercises 
would not be legally binding, they could provide additional 
clarity as to the likely responses of national ﬁ  nancial market 
supervisors in a crisis situation as the personal integrity of 
supervisors would provide an incentive for them to be candid 
in simulated responses to crisis scenarios. 
Internationalization of the supervisory process to protect 
against under-reaching by supervisors may also be valu-
able. History shows that supervisors consistently forbear in 
the worst cases, relaxing standards for failing institutions to 
avoid resolving them. Greater involvement of an interna-
tional body, such as the Basel Committee, in coordinating 
cross-border strategies would prompt action by domestic su-
pervisors. Guidance and announcements by an international 
committee can limit seconding guessing of supervisory 
decisions by providing domestic supervisors with the sup-
port of experts and insulation from political pressure. This 
is consistent with Kane’s (1989) analysis of the 1980s thrift 
debacle, where he ﬁ  nds that concerns about potential career 
damage and political pressure underlay the failure of thrift 
regulators to respond forcefully to the growing insolvency of 
the U.S. savings and loan industry. 
research is consistent with the observation that complexity is 
form of regulatory and tax arbitrage.
Living Wills
One partial remedy to complexity covered at the conference 
was living wills. In a regulatory context, living wills refer to 
plans by ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms for the unwinding of their operations 
in the event of ﬁ  nancial distress, including how the ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rm would be resolved in bankruptcy. Living wills are of par-
ticular interest because they provide a disincentive for ﬁ  rms to 
become complex for complexity’s sake and increase the abil-
ity of bankruptcy courts and ﬁ  nancial system supervisors to 
wind down the affairs of systemically important ﬁ  rms without 
fears of destabilizing systemic spillovers from the failure.
The discussion of living wills pointed to beneﬁ  ts beyond 
those associated with handling a ﬁ  rm’s failure and the chal-
lenges presented by the adoption of living wills as a stan-
dard. It was noted that constructing living wills may force 
ﬁ  rms to rationalize their corporate structure, leading them to 
become less complex and more transparent, and potentially 
improving corporate governance. Of course, simply mandat-
ing that systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms have a living 
will in place does not guarantee that the will is going to be 
beneﬁ  cial. The challenge facing policymakers and ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms is ensuring that the costs of constructing these plans 
do not exceed the beneﬁ  ts. 
To avoid this outcome, legal and industry practitioners 
argued at the conference that the design of the ﬁ  rst generation 
of credible living wills should include certain core elements, 
such as access to critical counterparty and collateral informa-
tion, triggers for activating recovery or resolution plans, and a 
menu of available actions related to capital, liquidity, and the 
declining value of assets as the weaknesses of the ﬁ  rm become 
evident. Regulators’ use of living wills should also be guided 
by core principles. To maximize their effectiveness, living 
wills should be coordinated across supervisors and jurisdic-
tions; that is they need to be part of the larger supervisory 
framework. In addition, living wills need to be risk-based and 
iterative (allowed to evolve as ﬁ  rms and ﬁ  nancial supervisors 
gain experience in drafting and implementing them). 
When resolution plans are not feasible or cannot be execut-
ed in a reasonable time, it was noted that the supervisors 
may beneﬁ  t from the power to compel systemically impor-
tant ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms to take some actions. These may include 
proposing alternative plans, simplifying their legal structure, 
improving information technology infrastructure, spinning 
off activities, and so on.
Challenges with International Coordination
The challenges of resolving insolvent systemically impor-
tant ﬁ  nancial institutions are compounded by international 
operations. A potential response to the challenges posed by 
large, complex, internationally active ﬁ  nancial institutions 
would be to directly address the complex ﬁ  rm structures 
that impede cross-border resolution. One proposal presented 
at the conference is for internationally active ﬁ  rms to oper- Judicial versus Administrative Resolution
There are basically two distinct regimes used to resolve 
ﬁ  nancial companies in the United States. One is the judicial 
regime under the Bankruptcy Code. The other is the admin-
istrative resolution authority of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC). Before the DFA was enacted, the 
FDIC’s authority extended only to insured depository insti-
tutions. Most other types of ﬁ  nancial companies (a notable 
exception is insurance companies) are subject to resolution 
under either Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The DFA’s Orderly Liquidation Authority subjects 
“covered ﬁ  nancial companies” to an administrative resolu-
tion by the FDIC, if resolution under the Bankruptcy Code 
would have adverse ﬁ  nancial stability effects. Under the 
DFA, bankruptcy is still treated as the default procedure for 
all nonbank ﬁ  rms, systemic or not. 
Possibly the widest divergence of opinion encountered at the 
conference surrounded resolution authority. This is perhaps 
not surprising, as the academic debate on judicial versus ad-
ministrative resolution remains fractious. It was generally ac-
cepted that the trend in the United States and Europe seems 
to be moving towards FDIC-type administrative resolution 
for ﬁ  nancial companies—at least for systemically important 
ones. Not everyone sees this as a positive trend.
Bankruptcy 
Generally, three advantages of a bankruptcy resolution were 
discussed at the conference. First was that bankruptcy pro-
ceedings proceed in a transparent manner according to a pre-
deﬁ  ned set of rules, which allows for better ex-ante planning. 
Additionally, creditors in a bankruptcy bear the risk of losses 
of the failed ﬁ  rm because the court does not guarantee asset 
purchases the way that a government agency would, which 
may create better incentives for creditors to monitor the ﬁ  rm’s 
condition. Finally, commentators argue that Bankruptcy 
courts are more independent and less subject to political inﬂ  u-
ence than a regulator acting as receiver would be.
On the other side, four speciﬁ  c concerns were raised about 
using the Bankruptcy Code to resolve systemically important 
ﬁ  rms. First, there is fear that bankruptcy proceedings can drag 
on for a signiﬁ  cant length of time, which would delay the re-
covery of the bankrupt ﬁ  rm’s creditors. A second but related 
concern is that the Bankruptcy Code focuses on maximizing 
returns to creditors without consideration of systemic spill-
overs. Third, in order for a ﬁ  rm to be reorganized under the 
bankruptcy code, there must be a creditor who is willing and 
able to ﬁ  nance the ﬁ  rm through the bankruptcy. Finally, there 
is a sharp disagreement on the treatment of qualiﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial 
contracts under the Bankruptcy Code.
It is possible that the perceived shortcomings of the Bankrupt-
cy Code could be ﬁ  xed by amending the Code for nonbank 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Subjecting qualiﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial contracts 
to a stay that is similar to the stay imposed under the Or-
derly Liquidation Authority, discussed in the next section, 
may improve systemically important ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm resolution 
under the Bankruptcy Code. Carving out the systemically 
important pieces of a ﬁ  rm and placing them in an administra-
tive liquidation would allow regulators to focus on containing 
systemic risk, while maximizing the use of bankruptcy courts. 
Though there are many suggestions for amending the Code, 
generally it is accepted that depository institutions need 
special bankruptcy laws that are less debtor friendly than the 
Bankruptcy Code to ensure expedited liquidity access for 
critical groups of creditors, such as depositors. 
Administrative Liquidation
Title II of the DFA created an Orderly Liquidation Author-
ity to resolve troubled systemically important institutions. 
The process of placing a company into an orderly liquida-
tion under Title II is no quick or easy task, as there are a 
number of procedural hurdles that must be cleared. If a ﬁ  rm 
meets the criteria to be considered a “ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm,” and 
it is in default or danger of default, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury and a number of federal governmental regulators must 
agree that the resolution of the company under other laws 
would have serious adverse effects on the ﬁ  nancial stability 
of the United States, and those effects could be mitigated by 
using the Orderly Liquidation Authority. The collective-de-
cision making aspect of the Orderly Liquidation Authority 
may encourage greater information sharing between regula-
tors, which, according to research presented, should lead to 
fewer suboptimal resolution decisions. 
In an FDIC-style administrative resolution, be it a systemi-
cally important nonbank ﬁ  nancial company placed into 
a DFA orderly liquidation or a traditional bank receiver-
ship, the FDIC as receiver of the failed institution looks to 
minimize losses associated with the ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm’s failure. 
Banking law grants the FDIC nearly complete authority in 
the disposition of a failed ﬁ  nancial company’s estate, subject 
to a least-cost-to-the-deposit-insurance-fund test. Unlike 
bankruptcy, the FDIC can self-fund the receivership. This 
provides the FDIC with signiﬁ  cant ﬂ  exibility relative to a 
reorganization or liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code. 
While an administrative resolution authority may be a valuable 
and legitimate way to maintain stability in the ﬁ  nancial system, 
it is not without its shortcomings. Time-consistency problems 
can lead to the underuse of resolution authority during good 
times and overuse during bad times. One of the presenters 
noted that in the midst of the ﬁ  nancial crisis in 2009, the FDIC 
issued prompt corrective action orders only in 19 percent of 
the cases in which the banks ultimately failed, an observation 
consistent with the underuse/overuse hypothesis. The Orderly 
Liquidation Authority is likely to suffer from this problem, as 
the DFA provides insufﬁ  cient protection against overuse and 
underuse of the resolution authority by supervisors. 
Recapitalization as a Resolution Option
The resolution of insolvent systemically important ﬁ  nancial 
companies does not always mean liquidation as implied 
under an FDIC receivership process for banks and some sys-
temically important nonbank ﬁ  nancial companies. Nor does 
it necessitate reorganization in bankruptcy proceedings, or a 
hybrid bankruptcy-FDIC resolution process. In a systemic Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Mark B. Greenlee is counsel and James B. Thomson is a 
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banking crisis, solvency resolution may mean the recapitalization 
of insolvent ﬁ  rms by taxpayers. While there is general agreement 
that recapitalization is vastly overused, is not always done in a 
directly accountable way (as a ﬁ  scal policy action or regulatory 
forbearance), and creates moral hazard, it still may be required in 
some situations and needs to be considered.
Why would recapitalizations be desirable as an option for resolv-
ing insolvency, especially when considerable time and thought 
has been directed toward ending bailouts of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms? The 
answer is simple: the failure of a systemically important ﬁ  nancial 
company is likely to come at a time of deteriorating ﬁ  nancial 
market conditions, when a large share of assets in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector will be held by insolvent ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. In other words, 
recapitalization is probably not an option to consider when a 
single systemically important ﬁ  nancial company fails, but it may 
be a viable option when dealing with a systemic ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Systemic ﬁ  nancial crisis management entails three distinct phases: 
containment of the crisis; recovery of the ﬁ  nancial system; and 
restoration of credit ﬂ  ows. When dealing with multiple ﬁ  rm 
failures, recapitalization may the best option for restoring credit 
ﬂ  ows. The presentations at the conference included a cross-
sectional study of banks in 15 developed countries during the 
2007-2009 ﬁ  nancial crisis that looked at the impact of public 
recapitalizations of banks and other ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms on lending. 
The results suggest that recapitalizations tend to increase lending, 
but the effect is far from uniform. The largest effect occurs when 
large banks are recapitalized and when the form of recapitaliza-
tion is common equity, as opposed to preferred equity. However, 
the results imply that partial recapitalization of the ﬁ  nancial sys-
tem is likely to have immaterial effects on lending, as increases in 
lending by recapitalized ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms are offset by reductions in 
lending by those remaining in ﬁ  nancial distress.
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